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ABSTRACT
As knowledge producers and transfer agents, the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World
Bank (WB) rely on their own research infrastructures to promote the
dissemination public governance reform. To enhance their authority
and legitimacy, they frame their economic knowledge through promi-
nent documents that set the agenda for policy advisory activities and
practices. This paper suggests that the inﬂuence of epistemic commu-
nities on the extent of change in these international organisations’
agenda-setting depends on their institutional determinants, namely
mandate, knowledge production processes and knowledge validation
procedures. Both IOs strategically select their preferred sources of
expert knowledge. The OECD refers to technical expertise to enhance
its new public management agenda through adjustments. The WB is









Good governance and public management reform constitute a considerable proportion of
the operational activity of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) (Pal, 2012; Sahlin-Andersson, 2001) and the World Bank (WB) (Bunse & Fritz,
2012; Thomas, 2007). As knowledge banks (Kramarz & Momani, 2013; Stone, 2003) and
transfer agents (De Francesco, 2016; Stone, 2004), both international organisations (IOs)
have pursued their mission to produce and disseminate knowledge for ‘better policies’
(OECD, 2011), ‘modernising government’ (OECD, 2005a) and ‘reforming public institu-
tions and strengthening governance’ (World Bank, 2003). With large research infrastruc-
tures, both IOs are analytical institutions capable of creating knowledge and policy
prescriptions for public governance reform in their member states (Miller, 2007;
Asuncion Lera, 2006; Broome and Seabrooke, 2012; Mahon, 2019). This analytical capacity
allows them to set new policy agendas that ‘normally [take] place within their already
established knowledge frame’ (Bøås & McNeill, 2003, p. 92).
The IOs’ analytical capacity is interdependent with global epistemic communities and
transnational policy networks. Focusing on the role of expertise on international
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policymaking (Littoz-Monnet, 2017), this article compares patterns of adjustments and
transformations of knowledge as reﬂected in changes in public governance reform agendas.
While there is a consolidated agreement that the OECD and theWB acquire credibility and
authority from external expertise (Kramarz & Momani, 2013), it is not yet clear which
factors mediate the inﬂuence of epistemic communities on IO agenda-setting.
We contribute to the literature of expert knowledge and international policy-
making by putting forward the following propositions. First, in the context of public
governance reform, the inﬂuence stemming from epistemic communities is punctu-
ated by new causal claims and technical expertise on the (positive or negative) role
of public governance on economic growth. Advancements in economic knowledge
and public management technical expertise inﬂuence the IO’s agenda regarding
public governance. We assume that epistemic communities promote their claims
and innovations to any IO interested in their expertise (Haas, 1990). The second
proposition qualiﬁes that IOs’ internal institutions mediate the inﬂuence of epistemic
communities. A given IO is more likely to strategically select a speciﬁc source of
knowledge and expertise that is attuned to its legal mandate and modes of knowl-
edge production and validation.
A matched comparison of the evolution of the public governance agenda allows us to
have a more nuanced assessment of the IOs’ strategic capacity’ to select expert knowl-
edge. This qualitative assessment is guided by the following question: To what extent do
the OECD and the WB diﬀer in reframing their knowledge as reﬂected in changes in
public governance agendas? We show that mandate, knowledge production and valida-
tion procedures matter for the extent of changes in public governance agendas. The
OECD adjusts its (new public management) agenda by relying on public management
expertise, while the WB transforms its knowledge frame and sets new agendas accord-
ing to the new causal claims of economists.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Focusing on the literature on
IOs as knowledge institutions, Section 2 discerns the institutional determinants of their
strategic selection of epistemic communities. Section 3 proposes the analytical frame-
work for discerning two modes of knowledge reframing and agenda-setting and deﬁnes
the methodology of this qualitative matched comparison. Sections 4 and 5 trace the
institutional evolution of public governance reform strategy in the WB and the OECD,
respectively. Section 6 concludes by proposing a future research agenda.
2. International organisations as strategic knowledge institutions
IOs produce, select and mobilise knowledge to strategically expand their institutional
missions and policy goals (Littoz-Monnet, 2017). This assumption is generally accepted
by scholars who have analysed the role of international bureaucracies in framing the
construction of knowledge to set new policy agendas (Dostal, 2004). Within IOs the line
between knowledge and policy process is blurred (Erkkilä & Piironen, 2014). IOs are
arenas in which experts and policymakers interact to establish the cause-eﬀect links
between policy issues, and designing and editing policy standards (Haas & Haas, 2002;
Sahlin-Andersson, 2000). These arenas are where external knowledge meets internal
advocacy, resulting in policy changes (Vetterlein, 2007a, 2007b).
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In these arenas, knowledge become consensual when its transfer from epistemic com-
munities encounters no opposition from experts and policymakers within IOs (Haas, 1990:
Haas & Haas, 2002). We maintain that, as powerful expert authorities (Miller, 2007), IOs
maximise consensual knowledge by selecting the epistemic community that shares its way
of ‘seeing’ their member states through a simpliﬁed cognitive framework as reﬂected in
documents and indicators (Broome & Seabrooke, 2012). This strategic choice of selecting
a speciﬁc epistemic community is due to the institutional determinants – namely mandate,
knowledge production processes and social validation procedures – established within IOs
and explains how IOs change their knowledge frame and agenda-setting. In other words,
‘the extent of response to new issues . . . is inﬂuenced by the consistency of the new issues
with an IO’s goals and procedures’ (Kardam, 1993, p. 1774).
The ﬁrst institutional determinant is the mandate of an IO. IOs as analytical institutions
use a cognitive frame and formal methodological technique to understand and make their
member states legible. We agree with international policy economists such as Broome and
Seabrooke (2012, p. 7) who argue that the way IOs do policy and see their member states as
objects is a ‘cognitive impulse [that] is often built into an IO’s mandate’. The impact of the
institutionalmandate on knowledge is also recognised byVetterlein (2007a, 2007b, 2012). She
observes that the dominance of economic knowledge and quantiﬁcation goes hand in hand
with the causal relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction that is estab-
lished in theWB’s mandate (Vetterlein, 2012, p. 52). In a similar vein, the OECD’s mandate is
to promote best practices among its member states. The OECD invests vast resources in
coherently editing and packaging the knowledge of public governance reform (De Francesco,
2013; Sahlin &Wedlin, 2010; Sahlin-Andersson, 2001). However, it is aware that ‘some ideas
or frames could become popular and powerful not because of their intrinsic properties but
because of the ways in which they have been formulated and packaged and because of who
transports and champions them’ (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006, p. 17). Scholars agree that
the OECD is also a successful mediator and translator of policy innovations and norms
because it involves non-member states and civil society organisation (Woodward, 2004). It
often has the competitive advantage of being a ﬁrst-mover (Dostal, 2004) and seeking
‘common sense’ among the member states (Theodore & Peck, 2012).
The second institutional determinant involves methods: ‘[t]he methods through which
an IO tries to establish what is going on in the economic aﬀairs of a particular country
necessarily shapes the picture that emerges’ (Broome & Seabrooke, 2012, p. 8). Methods of
data collection and analysis, discussions, decisions and evaluations of policies shape the way
IOs appraise the appropriateness of expert knowledge (Allan, 2019 ; Martens & Jakobi,
2010). IOs’ knowledge production practice and tools are linked to the form and content of
policy shifts. For instance, as a critical element of knowledge production, governance
indicators are set within an institutional context (Allan, 2019 ; Best, 2014; Broome,
Homolar, & Kranke, 2018; De Francesco, 2016; Erkkilä & Piironen, 2014).
Until recently, the literature has also focused on the knowledge authority of IOs by
examining their procedures of social validation, the third institutional determinant.
Institutional competitiveness, information technology capacity, internal bureaucratic
culture and professional specialisation shape the way the WB chooses to legitimise its
knowledge (Kramarz & Momani, 2013). Organisational processes of knowledge valida-
tion explain the diﬀerence between the EU and the OECD in pushing the better
regulation agenda through the use of regulatory governance indicators (Radaelli, 2018).
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3. Analysing changes in frames of knowledge and agenda
We advance the argument that these three institutional determinants mediate how
international knowledge institutions such as the OECD and the WB strategically
redeﬁne their knowledge and their agendas on public governance reform. The analytical
framework summarised in Table 1 allows us to comparatively assess the evolution of
policy agenda. Speciﬁcally, the conﬁguration of these three institutional elements (see
also Allan, 2019) leads to two diﬀerent processes of how IOs redeﬁne policy issues.
Extending Haas’s (1990, p. 3) typologies of problem-deﬁnition process, we argue that
the institutional dimensions of the OECD are consistent with changes by adaptation.
This process is characterised by incremental changes in policy agenda since the OECD
is not required to specify the means and ends of its policies. Its mandate and knowledge
production and validation processes revolve around the identiﬁcation of best practice,
peer review and policy benchmarking (Martens & Jakobi, 2010; Marcussen, 2004).
Based on managerial techniques, these governance methods can be applied to diverse
policy sectors. New public management is the OECD’s preferred source of knowledge,
as its practices are consistent with best practice, peer review and performance bench-
marking. Further, this choice is also consistent with the image of the OECD as the
largest consultancy in the world in which ‘the basic proﬁle of the existing OECD civil
servants would have to be changed gradually. From identifying primarily with epistemic
features, the OECD civil servants would have to identify with bureaucratic features
highlighting regular service to the member states’ (Marcussen and Trondal, 2011: 616).
To prove this mode of change in agenda-setting, evidence is required of the marginal
role of the epistemic community in creating new knowledge frames. The OECD
autonomously determines the policy ends and commissions expert knowledge to
strengthen its adjustments to NPM agenda (see Dunlop, 2009, p. 298).
In contrast, the WB’s mandate, knowledge production process and social validation
procedure revolve around the causes of poverty. In the WB, policy means and ends
have to be speciﬁed and legitimated by theories of economic development. This means
that economic knowledge (on the causal relationship between public governance and
economic development) is transferred to and strengthen by the WB as an analytical
institution. This results in systematic patterns of transformation and innovation into
the policy agenda (Haas, 1990). Within the learning typology, the problem-deﬁnition
process is led by the epistemic community of economists that is also predominant
within the WB (Broad, 2006; Mahon, 2019), shaping its bureaucratic culture (Nielson,
Tierney, & Weaver, 2006; Weaver, 2008). This professional aﬃnity makes it natural for
economists working within the WB to be inﬂuenced by the new claims produced by
economist communities. Evidence of this (formal) learning model of knowledge trans-
fer is the references to economists’ knowledge shifts in the understanding of the role of
public governance in economic development (see Dunlop, 2009, p. 298). These shifts in
knowledge frames are internalised and reﬂected in a change to the public governance
reform agenda.
Our empirical goal is to demonstrate that the institutional conﬁgurations summarised in
Table 1 lead to diﬀerent modes of change in knowledge framing and agenda-setting.
Methodologically, framing is an optimal unit of analysis in ideas-based policy research
(Koon, Hawkins, & Mayhew, 2016). Although framing can be understood in many ways
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and from the perspective of diﬀerent traditions and disciplines (Borah, 2011), we maintain
that there is a clear link between changes in the knowledge frame and agenda-setting. As
Entman (1993) puts it, the purpose of framing is to ‘select some aspects of a perceived reality
and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote
a particular problem deﬁnition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment
recommendation’. Consequently, this process of selection is reﬂected andmagniﬁed in policy
agendas. With the aim of ‘organising’ and ‘structuring’ activities, policy agendas are the
means through which some issues (in this case, of public governance reform) are emphasised
to the detriment of other knowledge aspects (Reese, 2007). As documents, policy agendas
enable organisations to codify and legitimate the evolving nature of knowledge on public
Table 1. Type of change in international knowledge institutions: Mandate and organisational
processes of knowledge production and validation as conﬁgurational factors.
OECD WB
Mandate - To promote policies by providing a forum in
which governments can work together by
sharing experiences and seeking solutions
to common problems.
- To work with governments (that share
commitment to market economies backed
by democratic institutions) in order to
understand what drives economic, social
and environmental change.
- To analyse and compare data in order to
predict future trends and to set
international policy standards.
- The WB Group has set two goals for the
world to achieve by 2030:
i) End extreme poverty by decreasing the
percentage of people living on less than
$1.90 a day to no more than 3%;
ii) Promote shared prosperity by fostering the
income growth of the bottom 40% for
every country.
- To support developing countries through





- Continued monitoring of events in member
countries through regular projections of
short and medium-term economic
developments.
- Data collection and analysis of member
states’ compliance with recommendations.
- Compliance is ensured through mutual
examination, multilateral surveillance and
a peer review process.
- Publications are a prime vehicle for
disseminating the OECD’s intellectual
output.
- To sponsor, host, or participate in
conferences and forums on issues of
development, often in collaboration with
external partners.
- To help generate cutting-edge knowledge
and to ensure that countries can access
the best global expertise.
- To assist developing countries in delivering
measurable results (as required by the two
institutional goals).
- To improve the design of projects, the
access to information and how to bring
operations closer to governments and
communities.
- To provide free, easy-to-access research and





- Production of knowledge with and through
member states.
- The OECD is mainly accountable to its
member states and large civil society
organisations.
- The OECD seeks to set international best
practice and standard through analysis and
prediction of general trends among
member states.
- To produce the best scientiﬁc knowledge to
causally link public governance and
economic.
- The WB has a broader set of stakeholders
such as the scientiﬁc communities as well
as the general public.
- The role of governments is neglected in the
validation of knowledge that revolves
performance measurement system (as





Change by adaptation Change by learning
Preferred expert
knowledge
New public management Scientiﬁc (economic) knowledge
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governance, setting the general strategy (Prévost & Rivaud, 2018), and providing direction for
policy reform (Theodore & Peck, 2012). By translating economic theory into policy advisory
activity and practice, these documents magnify the coherence of organisational discourse
(Dostal, 2004).
Since the emergence of public governance reform agenda in the 1980s, we trace changes
in the agendas of OECD Public Governance directorate and the WB Public Sector group.
We consider these internal specialist units as analytical institutions that ‘develop the
cognitive framework for understanding and solving policy problems’ (Broome &
Seabrooke, 2012, p. 3). Although it is undeniable that diverging schools of thought are
present in such complex institutions, subunits dedicated to speciﬁc policy issues tend to
have a common epistemological and professional background inducing a coherent orga-
nisational discourse (Dostal, 2004) and administrative style (Knill, Bayerlein, Enkler, &
Grohs, 2019). Changes in knowledge frame are reﬂected in prominent documents (De
Francesco, 2013; Enns, 2014; Pal, 2012; Theodore & Peck, 2012), such as the WB’s Annual
Development Reports and the OECD’s evaluation studies. These documents provide dis-
cursive evidence of how epistemic knowledge shapes not only the public governance
agenda but also the policy advisory activities, practices, and benchmarking indicators.
Our document analysis is complemented by academic literature and secondary accounts.
4. Reducing poverty: the world bank’s alignment with economic
knowledge shifts
The WB’s focus on public governance reform emerged in the 1983 World Development
Report (World Bank, 1983), The Role of the State, and successive publications that
acknowledged failures of developmental aid projects based on the state development
model. Based on public choice theory, there was a broad consensus within the WB in
favour of ‘smaller and better government’. The theoretical assumption was that policies
are made by self-interested and individualistic agents, ergo the conventional recom-
mendation was to avoid rent-seeking through a consistent reduction in state interven-
tion and the consequent shift of responsibility to the market (Best, 2012). The
prescription for minimal state intervention did not require the framing of a new
agenda. Structural adjustment programmes (pursuing privatisation and market liberal-
isation) were ﬂexible enough to accommodate conditions of public governance reform.
This accommodation of the public governance reform to structural adjustment was
necessary because of the Legal Department’s objections against any political interven-
tion by the Bank (Shihata, 1990). The WB’s involvement in public sector reform was
legally justiﬁed on the basis of economic and technical considerations. Although the
WB could not lend on the basis of political criteria, an evident, direct and preponderant
impact of the quality of institutions on economic development ‘may properly be taken
into consideration in the Bank’s decisions’ (Shihata, 1990, Sec. III (3)).1 As a result,
interventions for promoting civil service reform, legal reform, accountability for public
funds and budget discipline were deemed to be within the WB’s legal mandate (Shihata,
1In other words, ‘[i]t was legitimate to gather information on the political situation to enable the Bank to give good
policy advice and make good assessments of the feasibility and eﬀects of proposed reforms, or to judge creditworthi-
ness or project implementation capacity’ (Thomas, 2007, p. 733).
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1990, Sec. IV (3); Thomas 2007, p. 733). The concepts of the ‘good order’ of the political
system and rule of law ensure market functionality and are compatible with the public
choice theory that emphasises the incentives at the individual actor level (Best, 2014).
The mid-1990s provided a window of opportunity for framing a new ‘good govern-
ance’ agenda.2 Emphasis on ‘the role and eﬀectiveness of the state’ – as stated by
President Wolfensohn in his foreword to the 1997 World Development Report –
required a new conceptual frame in which issues of implementation, capability and
reform eﬀectiveness could be appropriately addressed. Because of the legal constraints
of its mandate, the good governance agenda had to be framed around the (necessary)
economic and technical connotations of investment and lending eﬃcacy, minimising
the political implications. New knowledge was consequently required to prove the
relationship between good governance and economic development. As a consequence,
a set of studies, also funded by the WB, emerged, forming the research agenda of the
‘new political economy of growth’ (Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 2010). Through the forma-
lisation of its good governance agenda, the WB was able to sanction certain politically
sensitive contents of governance, such as corruption and transparency, previously
excluded from its development programmes (The Independent Evaluation Group,
World Bank, 2008, p. 14). For instance, corruption is framed as a causal determinant
of economic growth rather than a political issue, allowing the WB to comply with its
legal mandate (The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank, 2008; Thomas, 2007).
Besides economic/technical connotations of public governance reform, the global diﬀu-
sion of democracy (Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett, 2008) facilitated the legitimacy of the
new agenda and ‘brought the rhetoric of accountability, decentralisation, transparency
and rule of law, all of which relaxed the inhibitions that had previously prevented the
Bank from including such topics in country dialogues with a large number of bor-
rowers – much less incorporating them as loan conditions.’ (The Independent
Evaluation Group, World Bank, 2008, p. 15).
Then, the 1997 The State in a ChangingWorld, the 2000/2001Attacking Poverty, and the
2002 Building Institutions for Markets drew on this rhetoric when structuring the overall
development assistance strategy on the good governance agenda. Whereas the ﬁrst report
spelled out the agenda for good governance, the others deepened the discussion on the
necessity of good governance and eﬀective public sector institutions for poverty reduction
and market eﬃciency. The WB now relied on rational choice institutionalism: ‘The
institutionalist economics literature, which has come to play a more important role in
framing good governance policy in recent years, is somewhat more nuanced, as it focuses
on institutional rather than individual dynamics and therefore pays more attention to the
particularities of historical and geographical variation’ (Best, 2009, p. 10).
This institutionalist turn was attested by a two-step strategy for achieving state eﬀec-
tiveness: i) getting government better focused on core public activities; ii) reinvigorating
public institutions and ‘mechanisms that give public oﬃcials the incentive to do their jobs
between and to be more ﬂexible, but that also provide restraints to check arbitrary and
2There is a general agreement among scholars that within the WB the notion of ‘good governance’ surfaced in the 1989
report on Sub-Saharan Africa. The report concluded that the crisis in the region was a consequence of a ‘crisis of
governance’ (Santiso, 2001; Best, 2012 but cf. Thomas, 2007). The consideration of the importance of institutional
quality in economic development was also due to the democratic institutional transition of former communist
countries, the East Asian economic development model and the ﬁscal crisis of the welfare state.
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corrupt behavior’ (World Bank, 1997). On the basis of the principal-agencymodel, the 1997
report also highlighted three incentive mechanisms for state eﬀectiveness: i) internal rules
and restraints, ii) voice and partnerships and iii) competition in public service delivery. It is
important to note that the ﬁrst two mechanisms formed the ‘voice and accountability
dimension’ of the Worldwide Governance indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi,
2003). Overall, the emergence of the WB good governance agenda was accompanied by
the design of a new generation of indicators to assess governance performance. During this
critical juncture, the concept of good governance shifted from institutional capacity for
sectoral development projects to ‘core public institutions’ such as civil service, legal and
judicial systems, and decentralisation (The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank,
2008, p. 16). Good governance also encompassed and redeﬁned the role of the state vis-á-vis
the civil society (Best, 2009, p. 12) to sustain an active civil society in policymaking
(Williams, 2008a, p. 49).3
Although allowing for the historical and geographical context variance, there is still
the attempt to discover universal application of the knowledge concerning the relation-
ship between governance and development: ‘although there is an enormous diversity of
settings and contexts, eﬀective states clearly do have some common features’ (World
Bank, 1997). Accordingly, the public reform agenda is framed in ‘universalistic terms’
(Best, 2009, p. 9). According to Best (2009, p. 10), ‘[t]his thicker set of universalist
claims provides a more robust foundation for expanding the institutions’ mandate to
include increasingly contested and politically charged areas in their programs’.
The WB’s most recent strategy for reforming public sector management has insisted
on political economic factors as the theoretical framework for developing ‘a pragmatic
problem-solving activity’ (World Bank, 2012, p. 1). The WB has recently framed its
knowledge according to evidence-based and managerial terms, such as ‘what works’ and
‘problem-solving’ (The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank, 2008; World
Bank, 2012). As the political economy and rational choice theories have been absorbed
and internalised by the WB (Best, 2014; World Bank, 2012), an attempt has been made
to predict reform trajectories across countries and to provide contextualised diagnostic
guides for informing practitioners on the design of development projects. There is an
alignment with a research agenda that is ‘less concerned with big, overarching analyses
and universal prescriptions and more focused on identifying analytical tools’ for
tailoring ‘better than before’ solutions to the speciﬁc problems of a speciﬁc country
(Grindle, 2013, p. 399–400). This ‘managerialism’ approach is about delivering and
improving public performance by ensuring that the formal institutions and the actual
policymakers’ behaviours are mutually consistent (Grindle, 2013; World Bank, 2012). In
other words, institutional and individual levels of analysis have been integrated, allow-
ing the WB to go beyond the best practice method and to shift toward the concept of
‘best ﬁt’ that aims to answer ‘what would work here’ (Manning & Willy, 2013, p. 223).
Overall, during every paradigm shift, the WB has consistently changed the knowl-
edge discourse on public governance reform. The WB’s mandate to maintain a non-
political orientation has constrained its engagement in public sector reform. This
impasse, however, has been overcome through technical justiﬁcations linked to the
3The realisation of its intervention failures forced the WB to search for agencies other than the state that could design
and implement development projects (Williams, 2008a, p. 48).
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performance of its lending programmes. The WB moved from universal prescription of
privatisation and deregulation to the acknowledgement that ‘best practice’ is a weak
basis for reform, as stated in the new Public Sector Management approach (Xavier,
2013). Between these extremes, the WB’s knowledge production and validation relied
on the theoretical underpinning that institutions matter and economic growth depends
on common historical patterns and legal origins. Finding policy solutions that ﬁt
countries’ institutional settings requires time and creativity (Grindle, 2013), and the
adoption of best practices is a now a legitimating practice among domestic policy-
makers (Xavier, 2013). Ultimately, best practices, as the OECD experience will show,
provide a coherent reform narrative. The social validation of knowledge regarding
public governance revolves around the understanding of the relationship between
reform and economic development to give policy advice to developing countries
(Williams, 2008b, p. 42–43). To achieve this mandate, the WB has not only produced
and funded research on the impact of institutional quality and good governance on
economic performance, but has also developed a set of global indicators of the quality
of institutions and regulation.
5. Modernising the state: OECD adjustments to common-sense
management best practices
The OECD started framing the issue of public management and its relationship with
economic development at an international symposium on public management held in
Madrid in 1979, (Pal, 2012, p. 40). The conference generated ideas that were later
formalised around horizontal themes such as human resource management, citizen-
administrative relations, budgeting, regulation and public services (Pal, 2012, p. 42).
Ten years passed before the establishment of the Public Management (PUMA)
Committee, a network of member states’ senior oﬃcials working on public governance.
PUMA marked a shift in the institutional mission from technical assistance modelled
around country-speciﬁc needs to a model of knowledge exchange based on a ‘broad
direction of change’ common to all OECD member states (OECD, 1995b). This shift
allowed the OECD to promote models for modernising the state (De Francesco, 2013;
Lodge, 2005; OECD, 1995a, 2005b; Pal, 2008, 2012; Sahlin-Andersson, 2001; Sharman,
2012). By moving the focus of its analysis ‘from the particular to the universal, from
models to modalities, from reform to redemption’ (Pal, 2008, p. 61), the OECD frame
knowledge about the 'modern state' can take into account countries speciﬁcities. NPM
models, the OECD argued, should be adjusted to traditional public administration and
principles of public law (OECD, 1995b; Pal, 2012). The endorsement of the NPM
approach and the focus on quantiﬁable goals and performance standards became trends
not only among member states, but also within the OECD, shaping its knowledge
production and validation procedures.
The emergence of the public governance agenda was aligned with the political
economic reform for promoting economic growth. The 1995 Governance in
Transition was the ﬁrst OECD publication to provide a synoptic review of broad
governance issues among its members (Pal, 2012, p. 47). Similarly to the WB’s The
State in a Changing World, the focus of this publication was the ineﬀectiveness of the
state (OECD, 1995b, p. 15) in facing ‘ﬁscal pressure, rising public demands, falling
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public trust, and increasing global economic competition’ (Pal, 2008, p. 62). Despite the
uncertainty faced by governments, the OECD remarked upon common reform trends
and the degree of convergence between public sector and management reform (OECD,
1995b; Pal, 2008, p. 63). Governance in Transition and other OECD publications of that
time de-emphasised the diﬀerent modes of pursuing NPM style reform (De Francesco,
2013; Pal, 2008; Sahlin-Andersson, 2001). Without relying on any theory of governance,
the OECD also had the tendency to label reforms as a set of NPM-style innovations for
public management, such as regulatory impact analysis (De Francesco, 2013) and
accrual budgeting (Christiaens & Rommel, 2008).
Unlike the WB, OECD’s creation and expansion of its public governance agenda was
never controversial in a legal term. The conventional OECD working method is to
create knowledge through data collection and analysis of speciﬁc sectors or problems.
Knowledge is shared and discussed in committees through general and thematic
conferences and workshops. Thereafter, the Council of the OECD adopts recommenda-
tions and principles to be implemented at the national level. On the basis of such
recommendations and principles, the member states’ implementation is subjected to
multilateral surveillance and peer reviews. These evaluation processes assess the per-
formance of individual countries and ‘are at the heart of [the OECD] eﬀectiveness.’4
Accordingly, the public management and governance activities of the OECD are
endorsed by networks of member state oﬃcials who are active and participative at all
the stages of the knowledge production cycle.
During the 2000s, key OECD publications (OECD, 2003a, 2003b, 2005a) recognised
the importance of the administrative and institutional contexts in which public govern-
ance reform must be implemented. However, these publications showed no self-
reﬂection by the OECD on its own knowledge creation activities. Mistakes were made
within ‘[t]he ﬁrst-generation pioneers of public sector reform’ by following the rhetoric
of achieving a single goal, economic eﬃciency, an addressing a single generic cause, the
bureaucracy. Pioneers reduced public expenditure, freed up the public sector labour
market and relied on market-type mechanisms without reckoning the new and multiple
issues governments face simultaneously, such as risk management and the lack of
knowledge and collaborative action (OECD, 2003b, p. 2). This framing ‘exculpates the
OECD from its youthful enthusiasm for NPM, but it also builds a platform for
departures, and indeed a wider agenda of reform that engages not simply management
but governance more widely’ (Pal, 2008, p. 66). The institutional complexity to achieve
modernisation was now appreciated by relying on the notion of ‘whole of government’
that the OECD used to remark upon the importance of administrative context and
culture (Pal, 2008, p. 67–70).
The whole of government approach was also adjusted through an organisational
reshuﬄe. PUMA and the Territorial Development Service were merged together into
one directorate, the so-called GOV(ernance), which also served the Regulatory Policy
Committee. In contrast to the predominance economic knowledge in the WB, the
OECD relied on the technical expertise and practice of public management as the
‘Public Governance’ label emphasised. The GOV label coherently joined PUMA’s
previous focus on the quality and cost-eﬀectiveness of public management with the
4http://www.oecd.org/about/whatwedoandhow/.
10 F. D. FRANCESCO AND E. GUASCHINO
expansion of the OECD mandate to focus on the elements of good governance, such as
transparency, accountability, and social cohesion (Pal, 2012, p. 50). Now, the units of
analysis are usually framed as emerging policy innovations, rather than speciﬁc institu-
tions for controlling the bureaucratic agent, as in the case of the WB. This epistemo-
logical position has allowed the OECD to be instrumental in the diﬀusion of policy
instruments (De Francesco, 2013; Porter & Webb, 2008). To establish its ideational
authority as a policy innovation transfer agent (Lehtonen, 2009; Marcussen, 2004), the
OECD deploys both meditative and inquisitive functions (Mahon & Stephen, 2009).
The recent explosion of public governance recommendations and recent OECD activ-
ities related to regulatory reform conﬁrm the soundness of this claim.
Overall, the OECD has strengthened the NPM movement. Through data collection,
discussions, peer-review, decisions and evaluations on policy ideas, the OECD produces
and disseminates knowledge and international best practices. Not only does the OECD
function as a type of knowledge platform; it reframes the logic and features of
regulatory reform. Regulatory policy recommendations are generalised and packaged
by the OECD (Sahlin-Andersson, 2001) to accomplish its mission to transfer interna-
tional best practice. Thus, the OECD has provided governments with inferential short-
cuts about models they can emulate (Sahlin-Andersson, 2001; Smullen, 2010). By
reframing public governance reform as a set of policy tools for enhancing the empirical
evidence of the modern state decision-making, the OECD reduced the uncertainty faced
by laggard countries in making the decision to adopt public sector reform.
A recent systematic analysis of OECD’s documents and publications on regulatory
reform attempted to assess in what manner regulatory impact analysis (RIA) has been
translated, reframed and packaged as an international best practice of regulatory reform
(De Francesco, 2013: Chapter, p. 4). A sequence of ideational activities was observed.
The OECD ﬁrst drew up a set of best practices and selected regulatory impact analysis
(RIA) as the policy innovation for simplifying the policy discourse on regulatory
reform. The administrative preconditions for and the political ideologies of RIA were
omitted. Recommendations for regulatory reform were then approved. Although the
OECD chose to label various policy appraisal methods and techniques as RIA, recom-
mendations and regulatory reform reviews were constantly based on the principle of the
maximisation of socio-economic welfare. Through this sequence of activities, the OECD
made RIA more intelligible as a tool for enhancing economic rationality rather than the
political control of decision-making. By fulﬁlling the aspiration of governments to
modernise (Lodge, 2005; March & Olson, 1983), the emphasis on such an attribute
promoted the adoption of RIA among the OECD and EU countries.
All in all, the OECD is an ideational agency able to frame policy innovations according to
its mission to establish good-governance principles and standards which are, broadly, well-
received by its member states. The OECD creates knowledge for translating and framing
NPM and best practices in common-sense policy reform. In other words, the OECD’s
discourses are forged out of member states’ knowledge and experiences and negotiated and
vetted by the same members (Theodore & Peck, 2012). As a consequence, OECD knowledge
discourses aim to catalyse consensus over policy innovations. Policy innovations are pack-
aged and framed in common-sense governance standards to facilitate rapid emulation. In the
last 10 years or so, the OECD has also been ﬂexible enough to update its organisational
discourse by going beyond the translation of international experience in a one-size-ﬁts-all
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approach. The OECD is now emerging as the best provider of oﬃcial data about government
reforms in the developed world through its periodic publication ‘Government at a Glance’
(Erkkilä & Piironen, 2014). However, hard evidence of the impact of public governance
reform on economic growth remains limited (Pollitt, 2013, p. 409).
6. Discussion and conclusion
This article assesses the extent to which the OECD and the WB have reframed the
common knowledge agenda of public governance reform over the years. By relying on
an analytical framework composed of three institutional determinants, namely man-
date, knowledge production processes and knowledge validation procedures, it focuses
on reframing knowledge as a coherent representation of given claims. Constrained by
its mandate and the predominance of economic knowledge, the WB has always been
required to make explicit the link between public governance and development. This
has forced the WB to rely on political economy theories, to generate new bodies of
knowledge by designing new indicators, and to be more permeable to external sources
of change stemming from economic knowledge shifts: from individual rational choice
to institutionalism, and from competitive benchmarking to ‘best ﬁt’ problem-solving
and managerial approaches (Murphy, 2007). Contrarily, by relying on (public) manage-
rial technical expertise, the OECD has changed less profoundly and has been able to
adjust its knowledge production processes. It has maintained its practical organisational
discourse based on meditative and socialisation processes. In other words, whereas the
WB produces knowledge through a deductive epistemological approach and, recently,
experimental research design, the OECD relies on an inductive approach to observing
emerging common-sense policy trends. Whereas the WB focuses on institutional
mechanisms of public governance, the OECD has focused on the new policy innova-
tions. This diﬀerentiation limits the signiﬁcant overlap in the production of knowledge
on budget planning and performance measurement, public management and employ-
ment, corruption and accountability, and regulatory governance.
During critical junctures of scientiﬁc knowledge shifts, how eﬀective are these two IKIs in
generating new knowledge on public sector governance? The WB has so far been able to
produce new knowledge for assessing the impact of good governance on economic develop-
ment. The jury is still out for evaluating the last managerialism turn as a response to the
perennial criticism of the lack of recipients’ ownership. The latter has never been a crucial
issue for the OECD, as its knowledge production is more stable and based on consolidated
internal validation procedures and shared learning approach. Because this article disregards
the extent of interaction between international institutions (Gehring & Sebastian, 2009),
future research should assess the extent of competition or mutual learning. By maintaining
a comparative perspective, it would be interesting to evaluate which knowledge (production)
system is more eﬀective in achieving a feasible implementation of policy recommendations
into domestic policies.
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